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Violent non-state actors in 2030: 
suggested Dutch armed forces response
Presentation by Dr Robert Bunker
Dr Bunker is CEO of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation. This 
corporation specializes in research on developing strategies and 
countermeasures against violent non-state actors. He is founding 
member of the Los Angeles based Terrorism Early Warning Group, 
established in 1996.
Introduction
Today’s main threat comes from non-state 
actors that cause friction and disruption 
within the system. These non-state groups 
challenge the values, social and political 
nature of our nation-state and provide 
a major challenge which means that in 
essence we are fighting today over our 
future state form. Possibly, we face the 
current meltdown of old structures and 
the rise of new ones; these new structures 
can be legitimate (the European Union) or 
illegitimate (mafia states).
Disruption is the main objective  
for non-state actors
The nation-state is in transition and chal-
lenged by non-state actors and groups 
such as illegitimate states, para-states, 
terrorists, pirates, organised crime, 
mercenaries, insurgents. These non-state 
actors operate very often in a professional 
manner, which is, for example, the case 
with street gangs. Non-state actors evolve 
quickly and blend in easily with other 
non-state groups. The main objective 
and the force of these non-state groups 
is their disruptive combat power. They 
aim at undermining the status quo of a 
society or order. During the Vietnam war 
the United States was militarily superior, 
but the Viet Cong won because of its 
constant disruption of people, govern-
ment and military. Future analyses should 
take into account that non-state actors 
adapt quicker to new circumstances than 
conventional armed forces. Fighting, for 
example, the influence of street gangs 
could mean that slums will be one of our 
future battlegrounds: this could result in a 
high dimensionality warfare in which laser 
systems, space (non-state actors might 
be able to rent satellite capabilities), and 
virtual reality could play a role.
The global transition starting twenty years 
ago has caused a strategic problem. This 
transition is marked by continuity, discon-
tinuity, grey areas and failed states. The 
transformation of war (or fourth genera-
tion war) is marked by a capability gap. 
As history shows during a transition phase 
new and old weaponry systems exist side 
by side and mercenary and private military 
companies flourish well. Nowadays, due 
to the deinstitutionalization, privatiza-
tion and outsourcing, there is a growing 
importance of mercenaries. Outsourcing 
is not necessarily a negative develop-
ment, notably if the state is able to loosely 
incorporate or ensure a linkage with these 
non-state actors. Mercenaries - very often 
former officers or former Special Forces - 
could challenge the state structure if in the 
future they lose obedience. Mercenaries 
could turn out to be a new sort of criminal 
soldier. 
Which role for the Netherlands  
armed forces?
To respond to the current transition phase, 
the Netherlands army has to plan for 
conventional and unconventional combat. 
It should consist of a light conventional 
force that plans in the short term for unre-
stricted challenges, irregular threats and 
combat with non-state actors. In the long 
run the army should plan for conventional 
post-modern warfare (between states). 
All military planning among the different 
branches (air, navy, land, marechaussee) 
should study and analyze the evolu-
tion of these national and international 
non-state actors. The overlap and synergy 
between crime and war and the growing 
numbers of failed communities and failed 
states (the “haves” and “haves not”) will 
continue to form a great source of conflict 
on a social and political level. 
